On Monday, the Venezuela Prosecutor’s Office issued an arrest warrant for Edmundo González Urrutia, the overwhelming victor of the country’s July 28 presidential election. It was the latest escalation in Venezuelan President Nicolás Maduro’s campaign to shut down the country’s political opposition and assert victory in a contest he patently lost. But this latest move is poised to usher the ongoing political crisis into a more dangerous phase—possibly its endgame.
Opposition leader María Corina Machado, who was barred from running in the election, has skillfully held together a broad coalition of support for González both within the country and abroad. On Aug. 29, European Union foreign ministers made a point of speaking with González and reaffirmed that they would not recognize Maduro’s claims of victory. Support for the opposition from the Organization of American States and the European Council, as well as the diplomatic spotlight on Maduro’s increasingly violent tactics and lack of electoral transparency, has helped keep the country’s democratic space more open than it otherwise would have been. The United States also appears to have been in back-channel talks to bring about a transition. U.S. Secretary of State Antony Blinken’s call and Vice President Kamala Harris’s personal letter to Machado and González were important high-level demonstrations of support. On Monday, the United States sent a more direct message and seized Maduro’s presidential airplane. Colombia and Brazil, seen as more sympathetic to Maduro, have called for the release of the electoral results and for dialogue with the opposition.
These efforts, however, have done little to persuade Maduro to change course and accept a democratic transition. As I have previously suggested, this struggle is in part because outsiders have consistently underestimated the resilience, ruthlessness, and adaptability of Maduro’s regime.
Given the other crises on the international stage, it may be tempting for international actors to regretfully move on from Venezuela and its problems. But that would be a mistake.
The situation in Venezuela remains extremely fluid. More than a month after González’s victory, thousands of Venezuelans continue to peacefully protest and defy their government—notwithstanding increasing repression by the security forces that has led to dozens of deaths, thousands of arrests, and driven opposition leaders into hiding. The Venezuelan people and opposition continue to deliver a consistent message to the world: This is the moment for change.
There is little appetite for returning to the Trump administration’s unsuccessful policy of so-called maximum pressure. Maduro not only withstood the pressure, but he also took it as a chance to further consolidate his power within the country. However, the calibrated approach to the current crisis taken by the international community also seems to have run its course. Last year’s Barbados Agreement, which was supposed to produce democratic elections in return for the lifting of sanctions, failed to stop Maduro from manipulating the electoral process and instead gave his regime a lifeline of renewed access to global oil markets.
Now, Maduro is playing the long game. Most foreign governments are unlikely to cut diplomatic ties with his regime, and he is narrowing the political space available for the opposition and using Venezuela’s institutions to legitimize his claims of victory. As the prospect of González being detained continues to grow, the question is what more the United States and others can do as Maduro pads his government with hard-line loyalists and prepares to inaugurate himself as president on Jan. 10.
The following are measures that may already be under consideration in Washington but should become reality as soon as possible if they are going to have any impact on a rapidly deteriorating situation:
First, Blinken and U.S. National Security Advisor Jake Sullivan should personally and unequivocally warn that there will be serious consequences should Machado or González be detained or harmed. That has not happened to date, although Blinken has called for “the safety and security of the democratic opposition leaders and members” to be protected, and one of his assistant secretaries condemned Monday’s arrest warrant. But more personalized statements, like the message sent by Harris, carry extra weight at a moment of grave threat.
Second, the United States, with the European Union and other Latin American governments, should call for a United Nations General Assembly session on Venezuela with the goal of producing a resolution in support of a democratic transition and highlighting Venezuela’s plight on the global stage.
Third, while the Department of Treasury will imminently announce new sanctions on senior officials in the Venezuelan electoral council, as well as intelligence and security services, the fact is that the United States could accelerate the pace of individualized sanctions on a broader array of people responsible for repression and electoral fraud. Doing so would maximize impact at a time of considerable uncertainty. History shows that sanctions are more likely to be effective at times of high tension and in the short term, becoming less impactful over time.
Fourth, if González is arrested, it may also be time to revoke U.S. licenses for multinational oil corporations doing business with Venezuela. Global oil markets have adjusted to the energy shock of 2022—prices are actually falling—making Venezuela less of a linchpin. For Venezuela, the easing of sanctions has been a boon, with production rising from about 735,000 barrels per day in September 2023 to 908,000 in June 2024. There is no reason for the United States to help Maduro cushion his economy at this moment, and there is little evidence that the lifting of sanctions appreciably lessened out-migration from Venezuela as intended by the Barbados Agreement.
Fifth, the U.S. Department of Justice appears to be currently withholding sensitive information from the public that led it in 2020 to issue a $15 million reward for the arrest of Maduro—information that could severely damage Maduro’s legitimacy domestically and internationally if it were to expose ties to issues such as drug trafficking, corruption, and terrorism. Already in January, U.S. senators called for the release of the evidence on Maduro’s alleged money launderer, Alex Saab, who was released in a December 2023 prisoner exchange.
Sixth, and most consequential, the United States, in unison with other governments, could immediately recognize González as the president-elect of Venezuela, not just as the person who won the election. On Aug. 1, Blinken acknowledged the latter, saying, “It is clear to the United States and, most importantly, to the Venezuelan people that Edmundo González Urrutia won the most votes in Venezuela’s July 28 presidential election.” Washington appears hesitant to formally recognize González as president-elect: The State Department’s statement marking one month following the election, for instance, called more generally for electoral transparency and for the democratic will of the Venezuelan people to be respected. The European Union is also divided on how far to go. This shell game must end, especially if González is detained. The opposition has released copies of around 80 percent of the “actas” from more than 23,000 voting stations, and it’s abundantly clear that González won fair and square.
Some may argue that recognizing González would be a rerun of what happened in 2019 when Venezuela’s National Assembly supported Juan Guaidó as interim president in a short-lived challenge to Maduro’s unconstitutional election the previous year. The current juncture, however, is profoundly different. What happened in 2019 was about constitutional violations by the Maduro government; this time around, it’s about a blatant attempt to steal an election won by an opposition candidate.
Recognizing González as president-elect would radically shift the dynamic currently in play, energizing the opposition and Venezuelan public at a time when there is a danger that internal momentum may be lost because of increasing repression.
Beyond democratic aspirations, helping the opposition succeed is crucial for reasons that transcend Venezuela’s borders. Mass migration from Venezuela and its status as a hub of international criminality and terrorism have upset regional stability, and, with the largest oil reserves in the world, the country remains an important part of geoeconomic calculations on energy security for the United States—and for China, Russia, Cuba, and Iran.
We are at a unique juncture in modern Venezuelan history, with a democratic transition on the line that will affect us all if it fails. Venezuelans will need more, not less, support in the coming weeks if they are to have a chance of success.
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