Following the fall of dictator , there is uncertainty over the future of Russia’s military bases in . The naval base in Tartus and the airbase in Hmeimim are Russia’s only military outposts outside the former Soviet Union and play a key role in the Kremlin’s activities in Africa and the Middle East.
The impact of Russia losing its military bases in would be devastating for the Africa Corps (former ) that are present in , , and in Libya, says Beverly Ochieng, a security analyst at the risk consultancy Control Risks in Senegal.
“We have seen the al-Qaeda group in Mali celebrating the events in Syria and looking at it as a potential inroad for further undermining co-operation between Russia and Mali,” Ochieng told the BBC news agency.
Mercenaries stabilize juntas
Russian mercenaries have helped military regimes remain in control in Sahel countries, which now look to Moscow or Russia’s Africa Corps for support.
Russia’s Africa Corps has replaced the Wagner Group, which was led formerly by who died in The Kremlin denied a role in Prigozhin’s death.
Military regimes in Mali, Burkina Faso and Niger, all countries that were once French colonies, have in recent years forced Paris to withdraw thousands of troops. France had initially deployed military personnel in West Africa on request of countries seeking help in fighting jihadist terror groups, which continue to threaten regional stability.
After turning to Russia for weapons and military personnel, the juntas have benefited from Moscow not pressuring them to restore elected governments.
New ways of building resilience
With the future of Russian bases in Syria uncertain, Burkina Faso and Niger may have to wait much longer for additional deployment or paramilitaries. Ochieng explains that, when they pushed out Western forces, they were waiting for Russian support to be increased.
“Those two countries are potentially at risk. They will need to start training local forces or looking for other ways of building resilience,” says Ochieng.
in 2024, Russia and Sudan in Port Sudan, allowing Russia access to the Red Sea. But Sudan faces massive political instability and is currently in a civil war. The infrastructure at Port Sudan is also in poor shape, according to observers.
Hager Ali, political scientist and researcher at the German Institute for Global and Area Studies (GIGA), says the conflict in has also been important for Russia in its war against Ukraine. By supplying weapons to the Sudanese Armed Forces (SAF) and the paramilitary Rapid Support Forces (RSF), Russia has gained access to Sudan’s gold mines. Gold has become increasingly important factor for Russia as it tries to navigate around sanctions.
“Fueling the war in Sudan helps to make Russia’s own economy independent of the dollar and work against international sanctions,” Ali tells DW.
Russian fighters, many of them former , also took control of the Intahaka gold mine in northern Mali, a strategically significant asset long contested by various armed groups.
In Niger, Russia is actively pursuing uranium concessions, aiming to reduce French influence over these critical resources. Analysts say this forms part of a broader Russian geopolitical strategy to challenge Western dominance over Africa’s minerals and energy reserves, and position itself as a key player in the competition for global resources.
Access to Sahel from Libya
Libya is logistically closer to the than Sudan, and according to Ochieng, Russia already has a heavy military presence in the country: nearly 2 000 personnel by the end of 2024. The vast, resource-rich country is split: a United Nations-recognized government in the capital Tripoli in the west. The rival administration of General Khalifa Haftar in Tobruk controls eastern Libyan territory, which includes Benghazi.
Libya remains trapped in political paralysis following the postponement of its general elections at the end of 2021. But Libya is an important base for Russia, because its limited capacity as a state capacities make it easy to conduct mercenary activities, Ali says.
From Libya, Russian can gain access to the entire Sahel, says Ali.
“Russia supplies the war in Libya via Khalifa Haftar by smuggling weapons into the conflict zone and gold out of the country. There is an opportunity to deepen the relationship with Haftar and access other conflicts,” he tells DW.
However, a switch to Libya would not be straightforward.
Ulf Laessing, director of the Sahel program at Konrad Adenauer Foundation (KAS) in Mali, point out that supplying military bases on the African continent from Libya will be “much more expensive, it will no longer be possible to bring in material by ship, the flight distance is much further and it is very unsafe.”
“Russia will first have to invest heavily in this base to organize flights to African countries,” he tells DW.
No further expansion in Africa
“In recent weeks, we have seen how military equipment has been flown out of Syria, some of it to Libya and eastern Libya,” Laessing adds. Russia has supported Khalifa Haftar, who has already handed over four bases to Russia for use.
But the future of the 81-year-old Haftar is uncertain, says Laessing.
“He has sought relations with the West, France, the US and Italy. So far they have exerted pressure on Haftar not to give Russia any more bases.”
Laessing does not believe Russia will be able to expand further in Africa or strike new deals for its Africa Corps – due to logistical reasons, especially into Chad.
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