Wars have a transformative impact on the parties that fight them. That was certainly the case the last time Israel and Hezbollah engaged in all-out conflict back in July 2006. Hezbollah emerged from that fight — which lasted just over a month — battered but defiant after standing up to the most powerful military in the Middle East. That experience, along with Iranian support, set Hezbollah up to make significant strides militarily and politically in the years that followed, transforming it into a transnational organization equipped with an estimated 150,000 rockets and missiles while also being represented by lawmakers in Lebanon’s Parliament.
Now, with a nascent cease-fire in place meant to end the war between Israel and Hezbollah, it’s clear that the group is going through an evolution of a different kind. The early months of the current war consisted of tit-for-tat exchanges, while Gaza remained the center of gravity. But beginning in July, the Israeli military and intelligence campaign against Hezbollah ramped up drastically. Through a combination of drone strikes, air power and high-value targeting, Israel has decimated Hezbollah’s senior leadership and military infrastructure. As a result, Hezbollah, long the most powerful member of Tehran’s Axis of Resistance, has found its ability to operate across borders constrained.
What appears likely to emerge — a more localized Hezbollah, operating with reduced Iranian influence — could change the decades-old regional security balance throughout the Middle East. Israel has successfully weakened both Hamas and Hezbollah over the past year — and its archrival Iran in the process.
But a weakened Iran can still be dangerous, and many observers have voiced concerns that Iran’s supreme leader, Ayatollah Ali Khamenei, could try to race toward a working nuclear bomb, now widely viewed as the only feasible deterrent against an ascendant Israel.
As the ink on the cease-fire deal dries, Israel is in arguably its most advantageous strategic position in recent memory: It has diminished its adversaries and awaits a second Trump administration that appears ready to double down on the maximum pressure strategy that characterized Donald Trump’s approach to Iran during his first term.
Back in 2004, Jordan’s King Abdullah II warned about the growth of a “Shiite Crescent” in the Middle East, stretching across Iraq, Syria and Lebanon and toward the Persian Gulf, that would energize Arab Shiite populations in Sunni dominant countries and destabilize these governments. After the last year of unrelenting conflict, Israel, with the backing of the United States, has systematically dismantled the military might once underpinning this crescent. Diplomatically, if Israeli-Saudi normalization proceeds, it will further solidify the growing anti-Iran alliance at a time when Tehran’s power and influence are already approaching a nadir.
Where does this leave Tehran? With Hezbollah posing a less potent threat and Iran wary of Israeli retaliation resulting from its continued support of both Hezbollah and Hamas, Tehran could shift its focus in the near term to strengthening other nodes in its proxy network, including the Houthis in Yemen or various Shiite militias in Iraq.
But it’s hard to imagine that Iran would abandon Hezbollah entirely. This is not just a function of the sunken cost fallacy; it is the recognition of a longstanding relationship with deep ideological, political and military roots. And if Iran was perceived as jettisoning a longstanding ally to safeguard its regime, other proxies could lose faith in Tehran and move toward a more autonomous posture, upending its longstanding foreign policy playbook.
Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu of Israel offered several reasons for his country’s acquiescence to a cease-fire, including his desire to focus more squarely on the threat posed by Iran. Speaking on Tuesday, Mr. Netanyahu stated: “This is no longer the same Hezbollah. We set it back decades.” But this kind of rhetoric hints at a level of hubris that may be premature. Mr. Netanyahu seemed, after all, sanguine before Oct. 7, 2023, that Hamas was content with the status quo — an assumption that proved deadly wrong.
The historical record demonstrates that insurgent and terrorist groups are difficult to fully extirpate, and Hezbollah is no exception. After emerging confident from its 2006 battle with Israel, Hezbollah became a major player in Syria’s civil war, where its forces helped prop up the besieged dictator Bashar al-Assad. There, thousands of Hezbollah fighters gained valuable combat experience by conducting both unconventional and conventional military operations and fighting alongside a range of forces, from Russian mercenaries to Islamic Revolutionary Guards Corps trainers.
There is no doubt that Israel has waged an impressive military campaign against the group over the past year, including a Hollywood-style operation where pagers and walkie-talkies exploded, killing and maiming Hezbollah militants and some civilians. It assassinated the group’s longtime leader, Hassan Nasrallah, and annihilated its once robust military infrastructure, comprising rocket launchers, weapons and ammunition depots, and a vast underground tunnel network.
But Israel has also damaged large parts of Lebanon during the war, virtually ensuring that Hezbollah will benefit from a new wave of younger recruits radicalized by the high levels of civilian casualties and suffering. And the group’s estimated strength of 50,000 men under arms as of earlier this year means that a sizable portion of its rank and file live to fight another day.
There is a longstanding cliché that while a terrorist group can be defeated, it is impossible to kill an idea. Hezbollah is not just a group, and it’s more than an idea. Unlike Al Qaeda and the Islamic State, Hezbollah is deeply embedded in Lebanon’s body politic, an integral part of the sociopolitical fabric of the country.
Throughout this year of war, observers have said time and again that the Middle East has reached a pivotal moment. Israel and its allies are optimistic that the recent shifts in the balance of power will endure. But for those who follow the region closely, this view might be shortsighted. To quote the former U.S. diplomat Richard Haass, who spent much of his career working on issues related to the Middle East: “Things often get worse, not before they get better, but before they get even worse.”
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